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The main principle of this thesis is to contribute to the explanation and description of 
regime change in the Middle East and North Africa through the aspects of transitional 
democracy. In doing so, it will explore several countries that are going through the transitioning 
phase in the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) region - Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, and 
what factors play a part in either the new form of government becoming successful or regressing 
back to old authoritarian way of governance. This thesis analyzes the forms of government as to 
the historical, political and regional significance of these concepts. In addition, it will use 
secondary data as the primary source of data used to conduct the qualitative research design 
method and data analysis of this thesis. The data collected is from scholarly journals, books and 
articles pertaining to how countries democratize. This thesis will focus on the economical 
struggles, the current form of authoritarian governments, lack of freedoms, educational levels, 
and gender inequalities in order to have long term stability. It will also cover how the use of 
technologies and social media helped pave the path towards this transition process. The 
background, development, current conditions and interactions of one or more individuals, 
groups, governments, or institutions is observed, recorded and analyzed for stages of patterns in 
relation to internal and external influences. The finding of this thesis concludes that while 
democracy is a way of life for all, there is no simple or normal method of how to set up a 
democratic government without multiple obstacles. 
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CHAPTER ONE: Introduction 
 
“The anchor in our world today is freedom, holding us steady in times of change, a 
symbol of hope to all the world”- George H.W. Bush, State of the Union Address, January 31, 
1990.   
The events that shaped the world during the end of 2010 and the first few months of 2011 
throughout the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region will forever be echoed as “The 
Arab Spring.” When it comes to democracy there is no clear cut path to achieve that end means. 
The citizens of Egypt, Libya and Tunisia saw each of their respected authoritarian regimes 
crumble right before their eyes as a result of years of ruthless rule and deteriorating conditions of 
civil life. There are multiple factors of a country’s regime that can ultimately determine the 
transitional stability to democracy. Those factors that are most important are: technology and 
social media, regime type, gender equality, economics and education. The main principle of this 
thesis is to contribute to the explanation and description of regime change in the Middle East and 
North Africa through the aspects of transitional democracy. 
Those words ring loudly in the world today as we see countries making giant leaps 
towards becoming free through democracy. Therefore, the work of this thesis is intended to 
demonstrate why it is important for the MENA countries to become democratic, albeit may not 
be an easy path to freedom. Secondly, the focus will be on the countries that fall in the MENA 
region, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, as they transition away from authoritarian governments to the 
early stages of democracy. The regimes of Hosni Mubarak, Muammar al-Qaddafi and Zine el-
Abidine Ben Ali were in power for decades ruling their citizens with iron fists. It is these 
relationships of those unique and hard-line styles of authoritarian leadership that forever have 
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lasting effects on the future of the countries. Lastly, the individual qualities that the former 
governments had will play a part as these countries try and set up new democratic governments; 
and try to avoid regressing back to their old authoritarian ways. There can be negative dynamics 
that work against these countries, yet there are also promising outcomes coming out of the Arab 
Spring revolts. As these countries move forward there is still much work to be done in Egypt, 
Libya and Tunisia in regards towards democracy.  
Democracy, it is argued, is an inalienable right that all men on this earth are created equal 
and deserve to be free. The only way for men and women to be truly free is in that of a 
democratic society that is ruled by the people. “Democratization is a process which leads to a 
more open, more participatory, less authoritarian society. Democracy is a system of government 
which embodies, in a variety of institutions and mechanisms, the ideal of political power based 
on the will of the people” – statement from the UN’s Secretary General as how the UN views 
democracy. The United Nation’s standpoint on democracy comes through the UN Charter, as 
well as in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was unanimously adopted by the 
General Assembly in 1948. Article 21 of the Universal Declaration is very clear on the 
importance of democratic values:  
"(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or 
through freely chosen representatives.  
(2) Everyone has the right to equal access to public service in his country.  
(3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this shall be 
expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal 
suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedure.”  
 
A democratic form of government is one in which the supreme power is vested in the 
people and exercised by them directly or indirectly through a system of representation involving 
free elections. Therefore it is important that individuals are given the opportunity to participate in 
these values of democracy. As these countries move through the transitional phase they will each 
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face multiple concerns that equally decide the outcome. These uphill battles that they will be 
going through will no doubt be slippery ones. Each step forward is a step in the positive 
direction, but if the current state of political unrest continues to become more violent and 
negative in thought this presents the opportunity for the country to slide back into 
authoritarianism. This old way of the authoritarian rule that has controlled Egypt, Libya and 
Tunisia, is one where history has not been kind to the people. Each country must now use its rich 

















CHAPTER TWO: History 
 
Since the 1970s the number of democracies has grown steadily throughout the world. 
There are approximately 195 countries that are recognized by the United Nations today, yet not 
all of these countries practice a recognized form of democracy. It is this movement of 
transitioning towards democracy that will be the focus of this thesis. This thesis will focus on the 
history as it relates to the third wave of democratization and what those factors are. By looking at 
the past, it is easier to understand the present and project towards the future. Within the last 
decade, the world has recognized that democratic state building is now an even more urgent 
movement, especially in the broader Middle East. As this movement continues freedom and 
democracy are the only ideas that can lead to just and lasting stability. Although there have been 
instances of reverting back to non-democratic regimes, the overall drift remains upward. The 
thrust of this thesis is to look at some of the difficulties countries confront on the road to 
democratization.  
One doesn’t have to look too far in the past to get a good understanding of what has 
transpired in the history of democratization. It would be easy to start at the beginning of this 
history and conclude with the current movement of the Arab Spring in regards to changes in 
democracies. However, focusing on the last 40 years will provide a good view as to what is 
taking place. Pre-1970s numbers show about 40 countries that were recognized as having some 
form of democratic government. Compare that with statistics from the Economist Intelligence 
Unit Democracy Index 2010, showing that there are now 167 countries that practice some form 
of democracy (Democracy Index 2010, 8). The data that was compiled by Freedom House paints 
another picture with approximately 195 countries surveyed with 147 of them practicing some 
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form of democracy (See Table 1). Freedom House went back all the way to 1972 with its data, 
but for this thesis it focuses mainly since 2000. This movement towards democracy can be 
attributed largely to the fall of the Berlin Wall and Communism at the end of the 1980s. Many 
political scientists have called this rise the third wave of democracy.  
‘The Third Wave’ was a phrase used by Samuel Huntington in his 1991 article entitled, 
“How Countries Democratize”, which examined how countries moved away from 
authoritarianism to democracy. The ‘wave’ as he put it was greatly focused on the democratic 
changes that took place during the 1970s and 1980s and triggered a global democratic revolution 
with more than 30 countries from several different continents changing their political structure. 
Huntington believes that this wave was the most important political trend of the late twentieth 
century (Huntington 1991, 579). Mr. Huntington describes these changes as the way of 
transitioning from a non-democratic to democratic regime and they greatly outweighed 
transitions occurring in the opposite direction during the same time period. It is in this study that 
he dissected the way the third wave democratizations transpired and carefully analyzed the ways 
in which political leaders and publics ended authoritarian systems and created democratic 
institutions during the 1970s and 1980s (Huntington 1991, 580).  
Huntington’s main goal in the ‘third wave’ was to explain the process of democratization 
in contemporary world politics as occurring in three distinct waves. Huntington heavily relied on 
J.A. Schumpeter’s “Democratic Method” which emphasizes democracy as merely an 
“institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the 
power to decide by means of competitive struggle for the peoples’ vote” (Schumpeter 1947, 
269).   Huntington’s principal ideas focused on what he believed were certain factors in the third 
wave movement that could possibly be identified to affect the future expansion or contraction of 
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democracy in the world and to pose the questions that seem most relevant for the future of 
democratization (Huntington 1991, 4).  
In all, there are five factors that he based his study on: deepening legitimacy problems of 
authoritarian systems, the global economic growth of the 1960s, changes in the doctrine of the 
Catholic Church, changes in the policies of external actors, and snowballing effects. It is those 
five factors that caused the third wave to spread quickly throughout most of Latin America and 
several Eastern Europe countries. Many of those countries that experienced democracy through 
this wave had strong Catholic backing. It’s interesting to note that the one region of the world 
that democracy had failed to infiltrate is in the Middle East, which is traditionally Islamic. 
Outside of Turkey and Israel, the rest of the region lacks democracy.  
Those five factors that Huntington thought were essential in helping democracy move 
throughout the world were broken down into three elements of transition. Huntington believed 
the process of transition happened in one of three ways: transformation with top-down change; 
transplacement with negotiated reform; or replacement with total regime breakdown. He 
believed it was one of these three movements that would set the course for future democracies 
throughout the Middle East and North Africa region. Again, it seemed like time was standing 
still, as it would take another 20 years for democracy to finally breakthrough in the Middle East, 
and that was largely in the North African region. With democracy continuing to spread, countries 
that did transition away from authoritarianism saw a rise in civil wars in their respective 
countries.  Democracy seems to rise and fall at different periods of time in different regions 
throughout the world. These changes throughout the world were supposed to bring ‘winds of 






“There is a substantial lag between Arab countries and other regions in terms of 
participatory governance. The wave of democracy that transformed governance in most of Latin 
America and East Asia in the 1980s and Eastern Europe and much of Central Asia in the late 
1980s and early 1990s has barely reached the Arab states” -A statement from the 2002 Arab 
Human Development Report (Human Development Report 2002, 205).  
As the Human Development Report states the movement for democracy in the Arab 
region has lagged behind the rest of the world, but since 2010 there has been a movement taking 
place in the MENA region. This movement is being labeled by some analysts as the so called 
‘fourth wave’, yet is nothing like that of its predecessors. This ‘Arab Spring’, as many have 
coined it, is still too young to fully know whether this new wave of democratization will truly be 
successful. The Arab Spring’s roots are not that uncommon from generations that have come 
before. Democratization from below is what has happened in present day with the Arab Spring. 
These types of movements in countries like Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia are from internally 
sparked uprisings. These citizens have decided they have had enough and felt that it was the right 
time to move from under the feet of their repressive regimes and seek new leadership.  
Whether associated with the Arab world or not, it is not difficult to reach the same 
conclusion as the statement above. It seems that Arab countries are slow at adapting to 
democracy, but nonetheless it is something that can happen. Since 2002, a series of United 
Nations Development Program Arab Human Development Reports (UNDP) have been published 
disclosing serious deficits in personal freedoms, gender equality, governance and knowledge 
across the region. These issues are necessary for democracy to prevail. The history speaks for 
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itself when it comes to Middle Eastern politics or its background of the region to know that 
democracy is least developed in the Arab countries.  
The uprisings that started to take shape towards the end of 2010 in the MENA region 
shows that there is hope. There is still plenty of work to be done with regards to the region. It is a 
popular conception that the Middle East is the last bulwark against the global development 
towards democracy (Selivk and Stenslie 2011, 205). What is meant by bulwark is to put up a 
defense or safeguard against something. It isn’t that the Middle East or North Africa is skeptical 
or afraid of democracy; it is the true uncertainty of what democracy can lead to. So the Middle 
East region has put up a safeguard around its form of governmental structure system to keep 
democracy out.  
It is these values or ways of life that are simplistic, yet problematic at the same time. This 
region is not the last stronghold of authoritarian rule. There are plenty of countries still dealing 
with authoritarian rule outside of the Middle East. Russia hasn’t fully embraced democracy. 
Most of the South-East Asia countries still haven’t moved away from authoritarianism to 
democracy. One reason that the switch to democracy hasn’t taken a firm grasp in the Middle East 
is that the rulers themselves are reluctant to share power. With that said, only Israel and Iraq 
worked to move towards democracy. Israel was set up as a parliamentary democracy when it 
gained independence in 1948 and is the only country in the Middle East region that is labeled as 
a democracy, whereas Iraq has been viewed somewhat as a failure in the international 
community’s view as a democratic state. This is the fight that countries are up against in the 
MENA region as some try to transition towards democracy.  
The literature argues that there is an actual difference between democracy and 
democratization (Selivk and Stenslie 2011, 206). One might look at the two words and think that 
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they are the same thing. The concepts themselves need to be clarified; what is the difference 
between ‘democracy’ and ‘democratization’?  
Robert Dahl a prominent theoretician of democracy says there are five criteria that have 
to be met first before a form of government can be labeled a democracy (Selivk and Stenslie 
2011, 206). ‘Effective participation’ is first on that list. Citizens must have equal opportunity to 
vote and express their voices in the political process of their country. The second item he says 
that must take place is ‘equal voting weight’. Each citizen’s vote must carry the same weight as 
all others in decisive elections. The third principle is ‘enlightened understanding’. The point is 
that there should not be any more class structure or categories that lump a single individual into a 
larger group, with no voice. This would give each citizen adequate and equal opportunities that 
best serves each individual, rather as a group collectively. ‘Control over agenda’ is the fourth 
principle. The citizens should have the right to select what should be on the agenda and what 
should be decided during the democratization process. Finally, Dahl believes ‘inclusion’ is a 
critical feature that has to be in place for democracy to stand. Individuals who must be included 
are all adult members of society with the exceptions of the mentally challenged and transients 
(Selivk and Stenslie 2011, 206).  
Huntington reaffirms Dahl’s definition of democracy, a political system that meets the 
three requirements of competition, inclusiveness, and civil liberties (Doorenspleet 2000, 387). 
These requirements are what many of the countries in this study have a difficult time with. Along 
with Dahl, Huntington thought that there would be a fourth wave of democracy to spread through 
the Middle East just as it has done in the last few decades in other regions of the world. It is sad 
that Huntington is not around to see what has transpired in the MENA region. This would be 
exactly what he had hoped for and envisioned, though it is still too early to tell if this could be 
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the fourth wave. What has happened in the MENA region as the Arab Spring came to the 
public’s eye in 2010, and it was those three factors that helped spark the uprisings. Without the 
individuals involved wanting freedom and other basic civil liberties, the Arab Spring may not 
have turned out as positively as it did.  
There is no set definition of what constitutes civil liberties or civil rights.  Freedom 
House is a non-governmental organization that has reviewed political and civil rights in the 
Middle East and since 1970 has had findings published in annual reports. By looking at the work 
that it has compiled throughout the last 40 years it is easier to understand those definitions. 
Freedom House has tried its best to explain these and other terms. Its methodology is based 
loosely on Dahl’s “Operationalization of Democracy”. The concept behind the Freedom House 
reports focuses on three categories. It divides countries into the ‘free’, ‘partly free’, and ‘not free’ 
categories. There are many criteria areas that come into play to place countries in the appropriate 
categories.  
By looking at these three categories one can get a better picture as to how they affect the 
chances for survival and for democratization. The breakdown in terms from Freedom House 
explains that a ‘free’ country is one where there is open political competition, a climate of 
respect for civil liberties, significant independent civic life, and independent media. A ‘partly 
free’ country is one in which there is limited respect for political rights and civil liberties. Partly 
free states frequently suffer from an environment of corruption, weak rule of law, ethnic and 
religious strife, and a political landscape in which a single party enjoys dominance despite a 
certain degree of pluralism. In a country where basic political rights are absent, and basic civil 
liberties are widely and systematically denied it is deemed ‘not free’ (Freedom House 2012, 4). 
The data that was compiled in order to place a country in one of the three respected categories 
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used two factors: political rights and civil liberties. Freedom House employs a ‘backwards’ scale 
from 1 to 7. A rating of one represents the’ most free’ and a seven rating represents the ‘least 
free’ of the two indicators that are used. An up or down status indicates an improvement or 
decline in ratings or status since the last survey (Freedom House 2012, 19). 
The MENA region encompasses eighteen countries. When broken down there is one free 
country, four partly free and thirteen not free countries (See Figure 1). By looking at the numbers 
from the report one can see Egypt is listed as not free with a net score of six in political rights 
and five in civil liberties, but there is an upward trend since the recent revolution that took place 
in January 2011. Much is the same for Libya as it is still recognized as being not free with a 
score of seven in political rights and six (though it improved since the last survey) in civil 
liberties. Unlike Egypt and Libya, Tunisia has shown signs of being partly free scoring three in 
political rights and four in civil liberties, with both categories showing even more positive 
movement. This is encouraging not only for Tunisia, but also for what lies ahead for future 
countries. Since 2007 all three countries have seen some of the most significant changes in 
improvements of freedoms according to the surveys and research conducted by Freedom House 
(See Table 2).  
So what makes these three cases unique? One of the biggest factors is that these countries 
are largely made up of Muslim populations. As it was stated earlier in this thesis, Islamic 
traditions and democracy typically do not go hand in hand. Although it is not this barrier that has 
kept democracy out of the region, it is the true not knowing of what democracy can lead to. This 
is the reason that all three dictators, who had great power, feared the roots that democracy 
establishes because it meant that most likely their regimes and power would be lost. Freedom, 
after all, is a powerful weapon. That’s why it is no surprise that the citizens of Egypt, Libya and 
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Tunisia had had enough of the oppression from their current regimes and believed that the only 
thing to do was to revolt. These demands for freedom led directly to the Arab Spring.  
In the truest form of democratization, people participate to a larger extent in the political 
process and decision making processes. In looking at the experiences of others who have 
undergone the democratization process, democratization can be begin from below, (society 
itself), from above, (individual leaders or elite groups), or from the outside, (typically external 
institutions, states or by force) (Selivk and Stenslie 2011, 209).  
The ‘above’ method typically comes from a new visionary leader, one who can promote 
democracy from within. Of course, one thing that hinders these types of leaders who envision 
change is that the rest of the elite have to provide them with the necessary space to democratize. 
One of the big drawbacks when rulers decide to use the democratic form of governance is that 
they give up their power, which in turn could lead to them losing their immunity. Power is one 
thing many cannot easily envision losing. Because of this, the rulers are fearful, which gives 
them little reason to encourage real democratization. Another area that these leaders fear is 
economic liberalization along with the continued restrictions on political liberties in much of the 
regions, which include the pro-Western vision.  
The Arab Spring is a product of democratization from below. The revolutions that took 
place in 2010-2011 were by the people. It seems there are few actors who have both the will and 
the ability to lead a democratization process in the Middle East. This was not the case in the 
Arab Spring countries. Each case had plenty of actors on all levels who participated in the 
separate revolutions. By now, the world knows of the democratic process and what it takes to get 
there. Many people, including individuals from this region want to participate in this process, but 
lack the ability or means to exert pressure on their authoritarian regimes. The common theme in 
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the transition process was that it was a mixture of societal members, not just one particular group 
or class. Even though the mix included members of different classes, it is going to take the will 
of the elites to help further the process along in the future.  
In respect to the uprisings that have taken place in the MENA region, the conclusion is 
that it is going to take citizens within a country to rise up from below. The emergence of ‘street 
pressure’ promises a new way that individuals see the light at the end of the tunnel (Selivk and 
Stenslie 2011, 231). It will take these types of events from citizens themselves in order for their 
leaders to better understand their concerns. This goes back to what Huntington was talking about 
when it comes to civil liberties and the importance of those freedoms for individuals to be able to 
call for change (Doorenspleet 2000, 387). It is recognized that every individual in the world 
should be able to elect one's leaders as an inalienable, universal right by the United Nations 
(UN), although many countries do not fully recognize or follow the UN’s outlines when it comes 
to free elections.  
The last avenue of democratization is from the outside. This is a huge one, due to the fact 
that most of the pressure comes from the Western powers such as the United States. It is these 
factors whether they are external actors, states, or other institutions that play a considerable role 
in the democratization process. This is the trickiest of the three pressures for democracy as it puts 
the role in an outside force that is usually seen as an occupier and not a liberator. Whether it is 
the likes of the United States, NATO or UN, outside help is not the first choice of the Muslim 
population. Muslims believe that the United States can help by staying out of conflicts and by 
refraining from forcing democracy on the Muslim world. Secondly, when they believe that while 
that time may come for the United States to help, they would ask that the US be that positive ally 
and intervene only when asked.  
14 
 
This paradigm is slow moving and the process will take time. It is this common theme 
with respect to international relations that most scholars believe will embrace this current wave 
of democracy. Part of this slow development is due to the fact that it varies on a case by case and 
basis and region by region. The path from authoritarianism to democracy never follows the same 
path twice. That is why it has been so difficult for political scientists and scholars to pin-point the 


















CHAPTER THREE: Regime Type 
 
It is not only the history that is important to look at, but also the type of regime of in 
these countries. What has been learned from the third wave of democracy in respect to regime 
transition and democratization? There are three areas of regime classification that took place 
during the third wave: one-party systems, military regimes, and personal dictatorships. These are 
just three that Huntington discusses with regard to the third wave, but they could easily be 
broken down into a more narrowed group that would include some 19 different classifications of 
regimes. For this thesis and more inclusive purposes of the case studies, only the one-party 
system, military regime, and personal dictatorship will be emphasized. Out of those types of 
regimes they can be broken down even more precisely when it comes to their role in transitions 
to democracy (See Table 3). 
Each country that was involved with the Arab Spring saw its current regime crumble for 
different reasons. Mostly, it was due to the arrogance of those in power because they didn’t fully 
understand the implications of the revolts. It was not the individuals revolting who had room for 
error; it was the leaders who had to make the decisions that would forever change their countries. 
In each case there were common themes that the regimes practiced against their citizens, yet 
there were plenty of differences as to what led to the unraveling of their respective governments. 
Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak’s authoritarian rule controlled his country with an iron fist. Mubarak’s 
regime could be considered a hybrid regime as the lines crossed over from time to time from 
personal dictatorship to a one-party system, yet at times looked like a military regime. Muammar 
al-Qaddafi’s military regime kept the Libyan people oppressed. For four tormenting decades, 
Libyans had been at the mercy of this prison warden -- part tyrant and part buffoon (Ajami 2012, 
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2). Tunisia’s Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali used his longtime personal dictatorship as a strongman 
with a system of control and oppression towards the people of Tunisia. As the world saw it, these 
three leaders ran their countries with total disrespect for the masses.  
The 30 year reign of Egyptian President Mubarak started with the assassination of then 
President Anwar El Sadat, as Mubarak was the vice-president. Many believe he was behind the 
assassination as it would be him who had the most power to gain. Since that fall day in 1981, 
President Mubarak has kept a tight grasp over Egypt all while still employing signs of political 
freedoms. It was not an uncommon practice for President Mubarak to have deployed the 
resources of a high-capacity state, which helped solidify his power. During his tenure in power 
he was able to successfully crush all threats to his rule. From minor riots, to political coups from 
within to outside assassination attempts, he stood tall. Political corruption was a big issue during 
his presidency, along with trying to continue the old pharaoh’s way of handing over the 
presidential power to a blood relative, rather than a military subordinate. That is why it was not 
uncommon for Mubarak to be the self-proclaimed Pharaoh of Egypt.  
In 1995, Terry Lynn Karl is credited for coining what would become the term, Hybrid 
regimes, which are characterized by a peculiar mix of democratic and autocratic features 
(Schmotz 2010, 3). Egypt was a pure hybrid regime from 1935-1951, yet under Mubarak’s 
leadership I feel he ran it again as a hybrid regime, although in a different form than what Karl 
would have defined. Typically under a hybrid model, access to power is open, but limited to 
some degree. It is these same degrees of authoritarian practices that severely limit civil liberties. 
Mubarak’s mixture of strong presidential involvement, fear and the use of military power fell 
under the autocratic features, while still allowing reforms and open elections to take place. Here 
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is a big key as to why it possibly took nearly 30 years to unseat Mubarak from power: the United 
States. With being a trusted ally he was able to position himself ahead of the opposition.  
That finally caught up with him due to the domestic unrest that was taking place before 
his eyes. Mubarak's downfall can be attributed to three factors: increasing corruption and 
economic exclusion, the alienation of the youth, and the 2010 elections and divisions among the 
Egyptian elite over questions of succession. These factors along with the continued limits on 
civil liberties accounted for change. The Egyptian people had endured six decades of military 
rule that had robbed them of the experiences of open politics, and they are unlikely to give it up 
now without a struggle (Ajami 2012, 3). The restrictions that were placed on the media during 
Mubarak’s tenure were his biggest weapons; it was these same restrictions that could not silence 
the voices of discontent of the masses in the end.  
Out of the three countries in the MENA region that felt the sting of revolutions in 2011, 
Libya may be different from the other two. In the case of Libya the past has been marred much 
the same as in Egypt, but unlike that of Egypt the transition towards democracy may be down the 
road as the democratic reform is still very much in doubt. The single gain out of the revolts in 
Libya was the ousting of longtime dictator and mad man General Muammar al-Qaddafi.  
Al-Qaddafi seized power of Libya in September 1, 1969, when he executed a successful 
coup d’état, overthrowing the monarchical regime. Since that One September Revolution 
granting him the throne, his ideology has been somewhat of a quagmire. For much of the first 
two decades of the revolution, the ideology of Muammar al-Qaddafi was defined in the familiar 
terms of Arab nationalism, positive neutrality, socialism, and Arab unity (St John 2008, 91). Al-
Qaddafi gained much of his political ideology from Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser 
during the Egyptian revolution of the 1950’s. Since the reforms that were taking place in Egypt 
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at that time, he shifted his thought process and aimed to bring the Egyptian revolution back to 
Libya. Behind al-Qaddafi’s ideology was to make Arab nationalism the focal point due to the 
rich history of the Arabian culture that he felt was part of Libya. By bringing in a new era of 
thinking his regime supported institutional reform, socioeconomic change, and pushed for a 
revisionist history. It seemed during al-Qaddafi’s regime his ideology kept changing along with 
that of ever constant reform change. It was these every changing ideologies that he felt were in 
the best interest for the country, but in the end it would only take more and more civil liberties 
and freedoms from them.  
During his reign he tried to launch stronger reforms against political corruption and the 
ineffective use of Libya’s oil resources; the regime promoted economic liberalization, centered 
on diversification, privatization, and structural modernization. But even these policies and 
reforms couldn’t last as he kept changing the methodology behind them. By selecting the 
members of the government, popular and executive officials throughout the districts gave him 
control over the Libyan government, which was to ensure that no one could challenge his 
authority. This system allowed al-Qaddafi to remain above petty politics in the theoretical role of 
‘The Leader’ or ‘The Guide’.  Obviously that works in favor of the ruling power, but it only puts 
further distance between governing and the public. Therefore it created a vacuum that was tough 
to escape.  
His economic platforms never took shape as he envisioned them as he tried to create a 
socialist economy that teetered between the ‘popular capitalism’ or ‘people’s socialism’. 
Therefore he was still pushing his system of direct democracy rather than a free market 
economy. Much of his time in power al-Qaddafi dealt with UN sanctions. This played a part as 
to his relations with terrorist organizations. These sanctions were not only in part from that, but 
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also dealt with how he handled internal issues of the people, most notably civil liberties. In the 
case of direct democracy few elements of Western-style, representative democracy are present in 
Libya today, but others, like the rule of law, respect for human rights, and freedom to dissent, are 
not (St John 2008, 104). Most of these reforms that were part of his overall ideology throughout 
the nearly four decades leading the Libyan people didn’t happen, due to the fact that he was 
unwilling or unable to recognize the deficiencies in the system he had produced.   
It is these issues that not only helped with the revolts in 2011, but in the end ultimately 
did him in. When the Libyan revolution started to take shape in February 2011 the future course 
of the country was set. As the protestors gained momentum the al-Qaddafi regime fought back. 
The Libyan regime shot down hundreds of peaceful protesters. Most of the participants in the 
uprisings have never found themselves going against the grain of the regime, but one can only be 
told what to do for so long. These same people do not even care as to what outsiders or the West 
thinks of the unrest that was taking place. It was about change and especially those changes 
would be in the best interest for the Libyan people. These same people listened and waited on al-
Qaddafi to make good on those promises of change that he had signaled since he took office. 
Those changes never happened; if anything conditions in Libya worsened during his reign of 
terror.  
With already on-going deteriorating relations with Western powers this move generated 
an immediate backlash against al-Qaddafi. Of course one of the issues of al-Qaddafi faced much 
like that of Mubarak, was that he was a quasi-ally of the United States. Even with his constant 
flip-flopping statements that he would make towards the United States. Libya’s transformation 
away from the authoritarian dictatorship of al-Qaddafi not only took place from below, but it also 
took the efforts of an outside resource, NATO. This was an important step for the United States 
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to back the use of NATO in Libya. Instead of forcing Libya to change, America led from behind 
in the transition phase and allowed the people of Libya make that change. It was this foreign 
intervention that paved the way for the rebels to topple the regime. NATO’s Operation Unified 
Protector officially ended on October 31, 2011, 222 days after it had begun (Daalder and 
Stavridis 2012, 3).  
Like most Arab countries Tunisia was an old state that had a defined national identity, so 
when the revolutions happened the country settled its affairs with relative ease (Ajami 2012, 3). 
The country of Tunisia has always stood out as stronghold of control and oppression of its 
people. This was no different during the tenure of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali. Ben Ali was a 
strongman who crushed every opposition that tried to challenge his throne. As his style of 
personal dictatorship continued to grow out of control, he didn’t discriminate against anyone; no 
one had a chance under his rule. Citizens that rebelled against his system of control usually were 
met with prison time or were exiled; the media was completely censored, and the judiciary was 
under strict political control. In 2009, President Ben Ali won a fifth term, with a massive 89.62% 
support (Paciello 2011, 3). This is no surprise as in most authoritarian countries the current 
regime typically always wins elections in stunning fashion with a majority of the vote, but 
generally it is how they receive those votes with the oppressive power with the use of force or 
scare tactics. Like other countries in the region one either voted for the current government or 
didn’t vote, but they were rarely opposed as that typically led to death.  
At the time of the Jasmine Revolution, Tunisia was quite unlikely to see any sort of revolt 
against the authoritarian oppressive regime. Something was different about the citizens in 
Tunisia; they knew it was possible to overthrow the Ben Ali regime. All the elements were set in 
place for a revolution to emerge. Although on paper President Ben Ali was oppressive in context 
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he was not as oppressive as his fellow dictators throughout the region. Tunisia has long enjoyed 
the Arab world's best educational system, largest middle class, and strongest organized labor 
movement. Yet behind those achievements, Ben Ali's government tightly restricted free 
expression and political parties (Anderson 2011, 3). Nepotism ran rampart throughout his 
administration as some way somehow everyone was related. This was a big part of the corruption 
issue during his years as president. Nepotism was so bad in the Ben Ali regime that it was 
referred to as ‘the Family’. With the family running the country it would take time to dissolve 
this faction. It would take a strong opposition to bulldoze the Ben Ali regime out of power and it 
was just that that happened in the spring of 2011.  
As the New Year began, the Tunisian people welcomed a new message towards its 
President Ben Ali and that message was: it’s time for change. When the Jasmine Revolution 
started to take shape in January 2011, no one other than the citizens saw change coming. By the 
end of 2011, Tunisia had become one of the most remarkable successful revolutions to sweep 
through the MENA region or for that fact most of the world in quite some time. It was Tunisia 
that set the revolutionary ball rolling for both Egypt and Libya. The scene in Tunisia was one for 
the history books. From the moment the movement began it caught the world by surprise, not to 
mention the Ben Ali regime.  
Each revolt was dealing with common themes each were up against, yet also had issues 
that had to be approached in different ways. Citizens of Tunisia were dealing with an 
authoritarian ruler whose corrupt and ineffective government was destroying the future of their 
country. From education issues to the unemployed and disaffected youth, Tunisia was 
experiencing growing pains. The youth movement was again the backbone of the Jasmine 
Revolution. The participants that moved the momentum forwards toward the capital came from 
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mostly the neglected rural areas. These common people joined forces with the once powerful, but 
now repressed labor movement and the elites to clash with the Ben Ali regime.  
The Jasmine Revolution was in part due to several factors. Like Egypt, Tunisia was 
experiencing a growth in population, most notably the younger generation. The percentage of 
young adults between the ages of 15-29 years old in Tunisia hovered around 38 percent 
(Goldstone 2011, 4). With that the market for jobs for an educated population was scarce; 
therefore the economy was unable to keep up with the growing numbers. This lead to issues of 
underpaid workers and those jobs that couldn’t meet the need of the rising economic times taking 
place in Tunisia. This was not the first protest that the Ben Ali regime had faced. In the past it 
was the same educated youth and workers that were carrying out the local protests. They were 
trying to call attention to high unemployment, low wages, police harassment, and state 
corruption. It just happened to be the right time for the masses to be able to come together for a 
common goal.  
One factor leading up to the revolution was the economical future of Tunisia. The 
economic policies of the Ben Ali regime were not always the best for Tunisia, but they were 
better than most in the region. Even with economic growth and macroeconomic performance, 
Tunisia is a complex case. There has always been a link between the regime and society. In the 
past the Tunisian people were provided with good levels of social services and benefits, but these 
came with a price; that price was the lack of civil and political freedoms (Achy 2011, 5). It was 
like a house of cards that was built too high, yet there was no real foundation to support the true 
need of the people. It was time for the house of cards to come tumbling down. It was these types 
of civil liberties that the Tunisian people had felt the wrath of for so many years that it was time 
for change. Being denied these simple civil liberties is just one part in the fight towards 
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democracy and that is why the Tunisian people spoke. As the masses gained more and more 
support Tunisia was the first country to feel the pressures of the Arab Spring.  
As the protests grew larger and more organized, when it came time for government 
intervention the country’s military played a lesser role in the revolution. Even with Ben Ali being 
a former military police officer the military held no alliance towards him in the end. This was 
due mostly to the fact that in the past the relations between the military and Ben Ali had been 
tense. The military in all accounts had been hiding in the shadows of the entire revolution, not 
even taking part in the new government in any meaningful way. It didn’t have anything truly 
vested in the regime that would have made it a real actor in either supporting or being against the 
revolution. It is unknown if it will get involved during this critical transition period.  
The three different styles of leadership between Mubarak, al-Qaddafi and Ben Ali were in 
a way linked together by that of personal power, greed and unimaginable visions for their 
countries. All of them seemed to overlap the other in regards to the type of regime that they 
governed. It is easy to label each one as an authoritarian dictator, but in sense each regime was a 
little bit of the other all wrapped up into one evil regime destined to implode given the right 
circumstances. Those circumstances were a combination of the will of the people, economics, 
power and greed that in the end ultimately lead to the dismantling of three styles of authoritarian 








CHAPTER FOUR: Technology and Social Media 
 
It was not only the will of the people that had impact as to the unfolding of these regimes, 
but the world of technology played just an important part. First and foremost, change revolves 
primarily around new information technologies and a growing number of enlightened and 
increasingly accessible pan-Arab media all of which offer uncensored news and expose the 
political elite and, thus, (at least some of) their actions to public scrutiny in an unprecedented 
way. These changes in censorship or technologies in general have laid the foundation for a 
growing number of social movements (Schumacher 2010, 2).  
With the rise in technology this gave the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia a better chance 
to be more successful than others, whereas in Libya’s case the social networks played a role, but 
not as large. This is greatly due to the freedoms of expression and countries allowing the media 
to be a part of the political process. It gives citizens choices and makes them better informed. 
When it comes down to regime change media is a powerful tool, for both the respected parties 
and the masses. This played out right in front of our eyes, with the most recent use of social 
media that helped the Arab Spring fully come about.  
The respected governments only added fuel to the fire by trying to silence the youth and a 
majority of the union parties in its country with its censoring of the media. The youth population 
in Egypt, ages 15-29, is said to be more than one-third of the entire country’s population. While 
the fires were still burning in Tunisia from the recent Jasmine Revolution, the events were just 
starting to unfold in Egypt. By seeing what took place in Tunisia this gave the youth a cause to 
act upon. In the growing world of social media with the likes of YouTube, Twitter and 
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Facebook, word spreads fast. The events that took place in Tunisia were all over the news, web, 
and social networks via smart phones. The dawn of technology had risen.  
The tensions ran high in Tunisia. A single death contributed to the Arab Spring revolt that 
would send Tunisia into a whirl-wind of change. That death was of Mohamed Bouazizi, a 26-
year-old Tunisian man. As he was unable to find formal work, he sold fruits from a vending cart 
on the streets that the police ended up seizing. A humbled young man who only wanted a fair 
shot in life, he then did the unthinkable. Bouazizi sat himself on fire. Some would say it was too 
extreme as it led to his own death, but others will argue that Bouazizi showed the world true 
Arab Nationalism and the triumph of the human spirit by setting himself on fire. Whether or not 
he died a poor street vender is contrary to the point as he set the Arab world ablaze. Once the 
protests began the Ben Ali regime acted like most authoritarian governments that fear change 
and tried to suppress the movements by force and violence. Particularly in the early phase of the 
uprising, the regime caused numerous deaths, radicalized the movement and eroded what little 
was left of the regime’s legitimacy (Paciello 2011, 8).  
These events and the death of Bouazizi caught the world media by storm. Soon reports, 
news feed and photos hit the airwaves showing the protests and the government’s intervention. 
The use of social media also helped ignite the protests by bringing the Tunisian people together 
to remove Ben Ali from power. Even with forms of media, such as the internet censoring that 
was in place, the youth were able to garner enough support for their cause. The youth that were 
at the heart of the social revolution were from urban areas and for the most part were relatively 
educated. These young people were the forerunners, who laid out the game plain that later led to 
a larger and more mass-based campaign. 
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By using such social media forms as Facebook and Twitter, this allowed the protesters to 
mobilize more quickly without real organizational structure. Social media was also instrumental 
in spreading information about the upheaval both within and outside the country. Despite the 
regime’s restrictions over the media, many Tunisians were able to get around the regime’s 
censorship so that information rapidly circulated among internet users, both internally and 
outside the country (Paciello 2011, 9). Even with these censorships in place, 38 percent of 
Tunisians had capable access to the internet (Stepanova 2011, 3). The crackdowns the waning 
governments placed on the networks also spurred new technology solutions, such as utilizing 
router/path diversity methods, IP proxy servers, and Google’s voice-to-Twitter applications 
(Stepanova 2011, 2). With the youth being more and more tech savvy it has become easier for 
them to get around such crackdowns by employing these methods.    
The success of the social media revolution in Tunisia didn’t come about without setbacks 
and a great deal of violence. It took one brave young man to start the revolution and it took the 
acts of the masses to completely ouster the Ben Ali regime. Finally, after several weeks of 
massive protests, government intervention, and mounting deaths Tunisian President Ben Ali fled 
in defeat on January 14
th
, 2011. 
Now it was Egypt’s turn. This was not the first time that the social network had played a 
part in protests in Egypt. The April 6 Movement in 2008 was the first social movement on 
Facebook, which attracted some 70,000 members. At the time it marked the largest youth 
movement in Egypt. As successful as it was it failed to grasp the full momentum. In less than 
two years fast forward to 2010. The Arab Spring was gaining momentum throughout the MENA 
region. What started as a small band of youth that supported change, turned into full support by 
all masses. The day was set. Youth activists agreed to hold protests against the state on Police 
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Day, January 25. This movement had one underlying goal and that was the ousting of the 
Mubarak regime.  
Unlike previous demonstrations in the region, this one had glue that would keep it 
together; as the size and momentum of the protests grew, these activists formed the Coalition of 
January 25 Youth. They had a plan of action that presented their ideals of change to the regime: 
the resignation of Mubarak, the lifting of the state of emergency, the release of all political 
prisoners, the dissolution of parliament, the appointment of a government of independent 
technocrats, the drafting of a new constitution, and the punishment of those responsible for 
violence against the protesters (Shehata 2011). The stage was set in Tahrir Square where 
Egyptians of all walks of life came together in mass protest to oust Mubarak.  
Besides the civil liberties, lack of economic growth and the constant political corruption 
the message of the 25 January revolts was to honor Khaled Sa’id, the blogger, who was killed a 
year earlier by Egyptian police. As if the public needed any more reasons to dislike the local 
police, his death led to even a greater hate. That is when the youth rallied together to form the 
Facebook group called “We Are All Khalid Sa‘id”.  The ‘day of rage’ as it was promoted started 
off small, but would grow to a powerful mob of citizens that wanted change.  
The scheduled protest was to last just a few hours outside the Interior Ministry building, 
which turned into a hoax of sorts for the government. That morning of January 25, organizers 
used cell phones and landlines to disseminate the real locations of the protests and the actual start 
time: noon (El-Ghobashy 2011, 6). The participants were to start marching down small side 
streets and pick up momentum as they made their way to the announced location. By this time 
the security would be outnumbered and couldn’t contain the crowd, explained organizer Ziad al-
‘Ulaymi (El-Ghobashy 2011, 6). The protest was to be non-violent as determined by the 
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protesters. Whether or not the police used force the crowds were to remain calm and not get 
caught up in the moment. There are times during the protests that things did get out of hand on 
both sides, but in the end cooler heads prevailed and the demonstrators stood their ground and 
made their point. For the next 18 days the scene on the streets of Cairo was one for the history 
books. 
Of course as the revolts were taking place on the streets of Cairo and other cities 
throughout Egypt, the Egyptian rulers had said that their country was not Tunisia and could 
survive these protests. In fact this was the furthest thing from the truth, as the wheels of the 
regime were falling off the track with each new day. In the last few days of the revolution the 
country was approaching a state of total civil disobedience.  In every arena workers were striking 
en masses. It was just not the youth, the students that led the movement, but elites of all classes 
joined in the protests to voice their discontent with the regime. With the elites now joining the 
protests, it was this development that finally convinced the military to oust Mubarak and assume 
control, according to Shady El Ghazaly Harb, a leading Egyptian youth activist (Shehata 2011). 
Since the fall of the Mubarak regime three main explanations have come to light as to what made 
this one successful: technology, Tunisia and tribulation (El-Ghobashy 2011, 1). Just as the 
government of Egypt had kept its hands on the media and communication networks, in the end it 
was just that that led to the downfall. This is due to the old Egyptian Constitution that allows the 
freedom of speech, but there are limits placed on those freedoms. Some of the freedoms that are 
allowed in the constitution in the end have been overridden by the sitting government.  
When it comes to freedom of speech Libya is not much different than most countries in 
the MENA region. Libya was the one case where social media didn’t play as big as role as it did 
with Egypt and Tunisia. In Libya traditional communication means were used. This role helped 
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achieve the goal of spreading the word more effectively. As of 2009 most basic freedoms, like 
freedom of speech, assembly and the press, did not exist mostly due to the state nationalized 
Saif’s budding media empire. That is why many countries in the MENA region deal with the 
same underlying issues for democracy or at very least civil liberties. Libya’s youth movement 
again is one of the youngest populations in the Arab world with one in three under 15 years of 
age (St John 2010, 4). Because of these numbers not only the current rate of unemployment and 
underemployment will be high, but they will only increase in the years ahead.  Another reform 
area that remains slow and uncertain at best is the human rights reform. These issues are loosely 
tied together as they go hand-in-hand. The demographics of protestors across the Arab Spring 
have been driven by disillusioned youth defending their freedoms and asserting their resentment 
towards the current regimes. 
It is these types of individuals that have been brought together for a just cause. The 
Libyan case it was not as structured as both Egypt and Tunisia nor did it use the same resources 
as those revolts. Nonetheless the individuals behind the movement to rid President al-Qaddafi 
from power have one common goal and it is to remove the regime. What seemed to be just 
another routine measure of power by the al-Qaddafi regime with the arrest of a human rights 
activist triggered a riot in Benghazi, Libya. As the protestors were peacefully demonstrating in 
the streets of Benghazi, al-Qaddafi directed the Libyan Internal Security forces to halt these 
protests by the use of tear gas and batons (Human Rights Watch 2011). This single act of 
aggression paved the way for the violent protests. At the onset of the initial phase of the Libyan 
revolution on February 17
th
, 2011, it was unclear as to how the end would look. It didn’t take 
long for the outside world to step in and take responsibility for the violence that was taking place 
upon the Libyan people. The UN authorized sanctions against Libya to include an arms embargo 
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and a demand for an immediate ceasefire. This only caused the situation to further deteriorate 
and the threat of violence against the civilian population increased (Quartararo, Rovenolt, and 
White 2012, 144). 
Before the uprising started to shift it into high gear, the Libyan people had hoped for a 
peaceful revolution much like that of Egypt and Tunisia. That was quickly smashed as al-
Qaddafi launched a series of brutal crackdowns upon the protestors. The events in Libya were 
more intense than that of the other revolutions taking place simultaneously throughout the 
region. All in all between the protests towards the regime, the air strikes by NATO forces, rebel 
fighters standing up against the Libyan military and the al-Qaddafi firing back at all involved, the 
task in Libya was much more daunting than first thought. The back and forth push for victory by 
all groups involved lasted roughly six months. Amidst the uprising taking place right under his 
watch al-Qaddafi said, “That his republic was not Tunisia or Egypt” (Ajami 2012, 2).  
He was right; Libya was not like the other two countries that were experiencing 
revolutions of their own. The people of Libya were more violent and felt more hatred towards 
the al-Qaddafi regime. The protests were met with a different result. Unlike the more peaceful 
happenings taking place in Egypt, Libya was in the midst of violent outbreaks. As it was known 
throughout much of the MENA region, Libya, the kingdom of silence, was at the realm of the 
deranged, self-proclaimed ‘dean of Arab rulers’. It was this self-proclamation that was the 
beginning of the end of al-Qaddafi. After many days of fighting between the rebels and the 
Libyan Army, the Libyan people prevailed. Al-Qaddafi was pulled out of a drainage pipe, beaten 
and murdered, along with one of his sons. A victory had been won by the citizens. Death to al-




CHAPTER FIVE: Gender Equality 
 
When it comes to an authoritarian regime many of the leaders like to make a claim that 
they have done positive reforms in relationship to women’s rights. Sadly most of these claims are 
only on paper. In most cases the relationship between gender equality and regime type are 
complicated in nature. It is these traditional dictatorships and military regimes that are based on 
conservative, religious, and/or nationalistic ideologies that actually discourage women’s equality. 
Depending on the dictator in control these ideologies may promote a traditional role for women, 
yet that generally reduces the gender equality (Ferrant 2010, 22). Although there are some 
authoritarian regimes that may bestow rights upon women from above to increase women’s 
equality, these are far and few between.  
Women who have been oppressed for so long under the authoritarian regimes in Egypt, 
Libya and Tunisia have much to gain in equal rights. The areas that women’s equalities lag in the 
MENA region are especially high in politics and employment, where as women's representation 
in economic and political power is almost non-existent. Their situation in education and access to 
health has been improved by growth in these middle income countries. But it is still slow to 
develop in the lower income states. There is strong discrimination in identity and patriarchal 
institutions limit the involvement of women in economic and political activities. Gender 
discrimination in economic activities can create distortions: more able women than men are 
excluded from the labor market.  
Women living under these conditions seek to have the same rights as their male 
counterparts. That is why when it comes down to these simple human rights that individuals seek 
it is important for those women to be informed, educated and have the freedom to voice their 
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opinions. This is a key to the transition to democracy. Without these rights as humans, 
authoritarianism will continue to negate the movement towards democracy and keep the citizens’ 
voices silent at all costs. The debate that continues amongst political scientists is that there are 
key links regarding the relations among Islam, attitudes toward women and gender equality, and 
the democracy deficit (Salehi-Isfahani 2010, 23). It is this democracy that over time is more 
likely to create conditions that favor greater gender equality. For the purpose of this thesis gender 
equality will be a focal point.  
Globally, Latin America tends to be the most unequal region, followed by Africa and the 
Middle East (Houle 2007, 32). Gender equality in the MENA region is often overlooked as a 
stable source of guidance or leadership. It is those same women and especially the constituency 
of women’s rights advocates – who believe that democratic development, with the association of 
civil liberties, participation, and inclusion starts with women. The region’s feminists are among 
the most vocal advocates of democracy, and frequently refer to themselves as part of the 
‘democratic’ or ‘modernist’ forces of society (Handbook 2010, 293). So even before the Arab 
Spring started to take shape, women in the MENA region started to stand their ground on the 
issue of gender equality and raised their voices. Research has been conducted in regards to 
democracy and gender equality that points to the correlation between the effects of democracy as 
it is positively related to the status of women (Beer 2009, 226). These correlations show that 
most women that are excluded from the democratic process are under an authoritarian regime 
(See Table 4). It is therefore the greater the inclusion of the feminist movement the greater the 
chance for a successful democratic governance.  
As the Arab Spring took shape and the governments of Egypt, Libya and Tunisia shifted 
away from the authoritarian stalemate that had been in place for decades and transitioned 
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towards democracy, reforms took shape as well. Although it is a slow process change was 
happening. Tunisia set itself apart from other countries in the region as it took on the reforms in 
such fashion to enhance women's economic, social and political inclusion. The outlook remains 
uncertain as it is early on in the transition period and only time will tell. In one of the first acts 
towards those reforms Tunisia mandated that an equal number of men and women run as 
candidates on the electoral list, and women have secured a quarter of the seats in the constituent 
assembly (Vishwanath 2012, 1).  
For example, a Tunisian feminist lawyer said: “We recognize that, in comparison with 
other Arab countries, our situation is better, but still we have common problems, such as an 
authoritarian state. Our work on behalf of women’s empowerment is also aimed at political 
change and is part of the movement for democratization” (Moghadam 2010, 293). In 2008, a 
prominent Tunisian feminist organization, Association of Tunisian Women for Research and 
Development (AFTURD), issued a statement declaring “that no development, no democracy can 
be built without women’s true participation and the respect of fundamental liberties for all, men 
and women” (Handbook 2010, 293). As we saw during the revolts of the Arab Spring it was this 
precise statement that was taking place; women were at the forefront of the revolutions. The last 
couple of years the world has noticed the power of the Arab women as true catalysts of change. 
Tunisia like other countries throughout the world has made admirable progress in closing 
the gender gaps in education and health areas, yet still lags in the total human development 
arena. With many educated women in the region and lower fertility rates the hunt for 
employment continues to rise. But jobs are scarce. Even when given equal weight with 
education, women are unable to compete on an equal footing due to several interrelated factors 
(Vishwanath 2012, 2). These factors that women face are mobility and agency. Part of the issue 
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lies with the legal framework of the Tunisian government. This legal framework, social and 
cultural norms, and regulations that restrict work and political participation are nothing new for 
women of this area.  
When looking at the data collected by Gaëlle Ferrant in regards to the gap between 
genders, The Gender Inequalities Index (GII) as a New Way to Understand Gender Inequality 
Issues in Developing Countries in 2010 paints a better picture of gender inequalities throughout 
the world (See Table 5). For this thesis the MENA region is specifically focused. The author uses 
a two prong approach to apply to his research. First, appropriate indicators are needed to 
compare the relative situation of women in developing countries. Second, there is renewed 
attention given to the relationship between gender inequality and economic growth. The GII 
avoids comparison between countries and ranking. Second, the GII is used to study the 
relationship between gender inequalities and economic growth using seemingly unrelated 
regressions. The end results show large variations between regions with the Middle East and 
North Africa with averages of 0.48 and 0.46 respectively. This includes Egypt 0.465, Libya 
0.497, and Tunisia lagging well behind at 0.156.  
The Gender Inequalities Index (GII) is a new alternative to measure gender inequalities in 
developing countries. It addresses the shortcomings of gender-specific measures through a new 
aggregate strategy using Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) (Ferrant 2010, 12). The GII 
is a new tool used to characterize women's situations in comparison to men's in developing 
countries. Ferrant’s research uses a normative analysis that describes a single optimal 




As these numbers shed some light as to how wide the gap is between men and women in 
the MENA region, it should be noted that women’s involvement in the political process is still 
lagging behind. It is this area of concern that should be addressed as women are still being 
excluded in many of these processes, because of their weak perception in the eyes of men. But 
the gap is slowly narrowing due to the recent revolts and women’s inclusion in the transitioning 
phases. During the democratic process women are sometimes susceptible to higher standards, 
which in turn can cause the entire institution to become weaker. If this process is not founded on 
the principles of equality and the rights of all citizens; and is not backed by strong institutions 
that allow political parties bound by patriarchal norms to come to power then democracy can be 
seen as a failed system. This is partially due to the implementing of new laws relegating women 
to second class citizenship.  
These are the everyday ‘norm’ issues that Arab women are faced with. Depending on the 
situation, these issues may be hard to overcome, yet in the right instances gender equality can be 
achieved. One way that it can be achieved is when women are more involved in the political 
process. Typically their numbers reflect higher in the overall participation and rights correlates 
with peaceful, prosperous, and stable societies. If the Nordic model of high rates of women’s 
participation and rights correlates with peaceful, prosperous, and stable societies, could the 
expansion of women’s participation and rights in the Middle East also lead the way to stability, 
security, and welfare in the region, not to mention effective democratic governance? (Moghadam 
2010, 294).  
Violence against women is another form of gender inequality and the fact is that violence 
against women in the MENA region is particularly higher than in other parts of the world. This 
cannot be overlooked when discussing aspects of gender inequalities. Women in Arab countries 
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typically don’t have personal security in any fashion. This provides them with little hope in the 
quest for equality and basic freedoms that humans deserve. In the MENA region it is not out of 
the question that many women are often victimized by their own families. Therefore, the public 
and governments can more easily victimize these women due to the lack of personal securities, 
which put women at a greater risk to be victims. The sad fact is that they generally have little 
power to defend their own rights and few champions to defend those rights for them (Arab 
Human Development Report 2009, 79). Part of the issue lies at the history of the region. 
Throughout history the Arab world has placed an emphasis on women as subordinates; women 
find themselves in this role even within their families and receive little protection from the law or 
legal systems against these violations.  
A statement from the UN General Assembly’s (UNGASS) on Declaration on the 
Elimination of Violence against Women, defined its focus as “any act of gender-based violence 
that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to 
women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether 
occurring in public or in private life” (AHDR 2009, 80). This statement speaks volumes. It is not 
just in the Middle East, but violence against women in general is a world-wide epidemic. It is a 
phenomenon that needs to be eradicated just like that of the plague during the 1800s. It is those 
same women and those dedicated to the cause of women’s rights, involved in the political 
process who will have to advocate against these crimes of gender, not to mention human rights. 
This is one of the single most important issues that the MENA region is faced with for the future 
of democracy to take root.  
If women’s rights and specifically gender equality are not addressed, nothing will change 
and in end the Arab Spring could be labeled a failure. Part of the problem is that when it comes 
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to these cases of abuse or violence against women it is most often their spouse or family member 
committing the crime. Therefore reporting this to the authorities is often overlooked as it is 
common practice by the police and the public to look the other way. That is why it is so 
important for gender inequality to be taken seriously by transitioning governments as part of the 
reform process.  
Development NGOs such as Egypt’s Association for the Development and Enhancement 
of Women (ADEW) and think tanks such as The Center of Arab Woman for Training and 
Research (CAWTAR) and The Center for Research, Studies, Documentation and Information on 
Women (CREDIF) of Tunisia are helping pave the way to address the needs of women in their 
respective countries (Moghadam 2010, 288). Those groups along with many Arab states that 
have signed and ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW) are thus obligated by its provisions, reservations excepted (AHDR 
2009, 84).  
In the case of Tunisia, the country has already done work to help the rights of women. It 
has shown great progress in amending the personal status laws towards women. Some of the 
least discriminatory laws against women are in the MENA region, especially Tunisia, which 
began to expand women’s freedoms and rights in the 1950s. But it is not the entire region as 
Egypt does not have the ‘unified personal status law’, neither does Libya. Both Egypt and Libya 
have shown some progress to make changes. This system is one that members of various ethno-
religious groups are subject to a certain jurisdiction of communal norms and institutional 
regulations in regards to personal matters such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance. This is a 
common system throughout the Muslim world as it is a subject to the Islamic, Shari’a.  
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Libya is the country with the most to gain from these changes, yet human right issues, 
specifically women’s rights progress, remains slow and uncertain at best. Egypt, Libya, and 
Tunisia have all signed this act, but only time will tell if any real progress is made for women in 
regards of true equality of rights. These issues regarding women’s rights, violence and gender 
equality are just a few that women in the MENA region are faced with throughout their lifetimes. 
These issues need to be addressed in a serious fashion for future generations. Whether or not a 
country successfully transitions to a pure democracy, the chances diminish drastically if 
women’s equalities are left out.  
Most scholars who have conducted research including, Gerring, J. et al. in their 2005 
scholarly article, “Democracy and Economic Growth: A Historical Perspective” relate the 
growth of democracy directly to the rate of economic growth. There is surprisingly just not much 
empirical research out there that has addressed the relationship between democracy and gender 
equality (Beer 2009, 213). Carolina Beer, political scientist at University of Vermont, conducted 
research that proves there are two key factors that deal directly with gender equality: those being 
modernization and economic development of a particular country. It is those two factors that are 
clearly important in generating greater gender equality; long term democracy and women’s 
participation in democracy are also strongly related to greater gender equality (Beer 2009, 226). 
The status of women throughout the world has significantly been affected by both modernization 
and development, therefore improving their status with that of men.  
The more that woman are included in the political process the greater the chances of 
equal rights will be given to them as they are directly in control of their own choices and needs. 
Even in poor countries, which include parts of the MENA region with low levels of public 
spending, literacy, democracy, and women’s participation, these two factors can make a 
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difference in the lives of women. It is unrealistic to expect democracy to fix long-standing 
structural problems such as income, racial, ethnic, and gender inequality in just a few years after 
a new regime is established (Beer 2009, 225). But it is those key factors that play into women 
being equal vary from country to country.  
As gender equality rises in a country the greater stability the country has to successfully 
transition into a democracy. The numbers in (See Table 6) show that even more recently the gap 
between equality of genders in the MENA region seems to be trending downwards to a narrower 
margin. It is these types of trends that show there is hope for the region in the efforts of women 
and gaining more equal rights. It seems out of the three countries examined in the case studies of 
this thesis Tunisia is the least discriminatory towards women. Tunisia is a stark example that by 
including women in the political process, giving them equal weight when it comes to human 
rights; and allowing them to receive proper education and training, the country’s overall 
successful transition towards democracy has become greater than both Egypt and Libya. The 
case for Egypt is an alarming one as most rules of state go against women’s rights. Even as the 
most populist Arab country, Egypt lacks real reform of these issues regarding discriminations 
towards women. Egyptian women’s groups campaigned for the issuance of individual identity 
cards for women and for women’s right to a khul divorce (Moghadam 2010, 288). These are 
important steps for women’s rights in Egypt. Studies have shown that Egypt is on the right track 
to achieving most of the Millennium Development Goals that have been set by the 2015 date.  
The Declaration of the Right to Development was established in 1986 by the UN, which 
formally defined this fundamental human right. This declaration sets out provisions for states 
that they must provide public policies that enhance the well being of their citizens (Sika 2011, 
27). This is the case for the MENA region as most MENA countries go against these policies or 
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UN declarations that are geared to end discrimination against women. Until these countries start 
to follow such guidelines, the discrimination will directly obstruct good governance and will 
work against the efficiency of social and legal institutions (Sika 2011, 27-28). It is this same 
discrimination towards women that also hinders economic success and development. These 
inequalities of gender in the MENA region also are tied to directly to both economics and 
education. That is why gender inequalities, economics and education can play a key role as to 
how the transition towards democracy pans out. If any of those three factors are not in the 
formula the success rate towards democracy tends to be lower. As the improvements for gender 
equality continue to occur so too will the positive gains of the economy and educational levels of 
the region. The roles that economics and education play in this process are just as important as 














CHAPTER SIX: Economics and Education 
 
The economical and educational scene in the MENA region before and during the Arab 
Spring was in sharp contrast as to why the revolutions happened in the first place. Egypt, Libya 
and Tunisia all have rich histories of wealth in some fashion, yet the present day struggles for the 
people would have portrayed a different picture than that of wealth. A vast majority of the 
citizens lived in poverty and less than desirable conditions. An estimated 41 percent of these 
people live below the poverty line (Beck and Huser 2012, 6). As these individuals dealt with 
lower incomes and more oppression on civil rights; they didn’t have much to lose other than their 
lives. People had had enough of living in poverty so they rallied together to seek improvements 
on all levels. It wasn’t just one socially driven background, but a vast array of small business 
owners, poverty-stricken individuals, and elites that felt the suffocating grip of their authoritarian 
regimes. Looking back at the uprisings that affected Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, a common theme 
was in place: the education standards as an overall were less than desirable and the economic 
state in each country were decaying along with the regimes.  
Revolutions can often lead to more de jure changes in political institutions, without 
necessarily altering the underlying distribution of economic power; these lessons don’t always 
result in effective changes. That is why it is difficult to see how the future will play out for the 
MENA region in regards to economic reforms or changes. Breaking down the economic barrier 
in the Middle East isn’t as easy as it would seem. The relationship between the level of 
development (income per head) of a country and the effects that has on democracy is not clear 
cut. It gets even more difficult when such countries in the MENA region have a vast wealth of 
oil and other fine commodities at their disposal, but it is who is in power that typically controls 
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these assets and therefore it is only a select few that see any of the royalties from sales. The 
MENA region could be labeled as a rentier state region when it deals with oil issues. Even with 
the incomes of the oil-rich countries improving the average outcomes in education and health, 
there is still a lag in its overall effect on women and youth. Each country handles these issues 
differently as not one economy is like that of the next.  
The Middle East and oil go hand-in-hand. Commodity markets tend to flux on the drop of 
a dime, and with the political unrest that has taken place the region countries like Libya have 
seen the efforts of these markets. These risks that Libya and other Arab economies face place 
great stress on the transition process. In most cases the public financial institutions are at the 
mercy at the hands of the volatile oil markets. One aspect that can be looked at is the rentier state 
theory. Martin Beck and Simone Huser use this theory to explain how the current economical 
make-up of the countries has been plagued heavily by the rentier state experience. This theory 
came about after the oil boom in the 1970s, which established the idea of the rent‐based system 
of “petrolism” in the Middle East. Rents are incomes which are not balanced by labor and 
capital, and are thus at the free disposal of the recipients (Beck and Huser 2012, 8).  
Out of the three cases examined here, Libya is the one where oil is a bigger factor than 
that of the other two countries. The enormous oil rents that are placed on the country can only 
entrench the autocratic rule of governance. These rulers can finance far-reaching patronage 
networks and security apparatuses, yet cripple the economy and markets at the same time. Oil 
revenue removes the need to levy taxes, thereby reducing accountability, which causes the civil 
societies to become much weaker and at the hands of the government throughout the region 
(Democracy Index 2010, 26). Egypt also has felt the strains from these tactics. As one of the 
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largest authoritarian countries in the region, Egypt has suffered declines from already low levels, 
as the ruling regime has tightened its control even further.  
When political unrest takes place Arab governments typically have used their military 
might to subdue the protests or they will increase subsidies on food and fuel like the case in 
Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. This only hurts the citizens as it causes more strife in the quality of 
living. Outside the oil market the MENA region suffers from a dangerous deficiency of 
manufacturing products and goods. The MENA region holds less than one percent of world 
market share in non-fuel exports (Malik and Awadallah 2011, 8). Since the 1970s the Arab GDP 
growth has been closely tied to the rise in export revenues, dominated by fuel exports. The latter 
constituted 75, 72.6 and 81.4 per cent of merchandise exports of the high income (HIC), middle 
income (MIC) and low income (LIC) groups respectively in 2006 (AHDR 2009, 100).  
It is these oil markets that play an important part in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 
the MENA region for the most part are in the middle of the playing field. If more emphasis can 
be placed on these other areas of income or production then most likely it will loosen the 
stagnant economical grip that has settled over the region. One can look at the GDP of countries 
like Egypt, Libya and Tunisia and see what each is faced within the global markets. These 
numbers are a little outdated, but they paint a good picture as to the lagging economy and 
financial development taking place. Egypt, Libya and Tunisia are on average more equal in terms 
of income than middle income countries, but not low or high income countries. The data 
compares key financial and real indicators along with the economic growth proxy across the 
geographical region to include income groups (See Table 7).  
Among the data that was used to show how the specific geographic regions faired in 
regards to GDP per capita in US dollars, the MENA region ($2,026.6) was lower than Latin 
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America & Caribbean countries ($2,865.2), yet had higher GDP per capita than countries 
throughout the Sub-Saharan Africa ($849.1), which had the lowest GDP per capita (Hassan 
2011, 92). What do all these numbers mean? Hassan’s research shows that there is a serious need 
for reform in the region when it comes down to the MENA region’s financial system. If these 
efforts were addressed correctly it would be quite valuable for the MENA countries and provide 
incentives to develop outside trade with neighboring states, not to mention other global players 
(Hassan 2011, 99).  
This lack of development in the manufacturing world has hindered the Arab economies. 
It is these types of underdevelopment that play a critical part in the successful transition phase. 
Without a multi-diverse economic market these Arab economies will falter. As the world 
becomes more globalized, the Middle East remains well behind in terms of production, trade and 
economic linkage. Surprisingly it is that trade linkage between Arab countries that is weak. For 
whatever the reason is Arab countries do not see their neighbors to be natural trading partners. 
This again keeps what goods could be traded between neighbors out of the market therefore 
creating no new economic growth. Even with positive oil-led growth in the region, it can actually 
make things worse in turn. It has created a weak structural foundation in the Arab economies.  
That is why so many Arab countries have turned to increasingly import oriented and 
service based economies. This is where the region lags behind other parts of the world. The types 
of services found in Arab countries fall at the low end of the value adding chain, contribute little 
to local knowledge development, and lock countries into inferior positions in global markets. 
This trend, which has been at the expense of Arab agriculture, manufacturing and industrial 
production, is therefore of concern (AHDR 2009, 103). If these other avenues of income are not 
addressed it will cause the MENA region to become stagnant in economic growth. These critical 
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markets are every so important for the countries to become more independent upon themselves. 
All of these factors, plus the rising unemployment numbers, are detrimental to the MENA 
countries.  
The number of unemployed throughout the MENA region varies in terms of each country 
and by looking at those numbers that include education level; they alone paint a grave picture as 
to part of the problem. These numbers are not specific to just Egypt, Libya or Tunisia, but the 
MENA region in general (See Table 8). The economic scene in Egypt is plagued with high 
numbers of unemployment and political corruption that must be addressed; these reforms are 
needed for the economical levels to turn upward for the country.  
The high youth unemployment can be attributed to two factors. The first factor is the 
actual knowledge the youth gain with their degrees as it relates directly to the productive skills. 
This typically causes a big gap in what the student learns in school and what is needed in the 
MENA labor markets. Secondly, youth who come from middle or upper classes can sometimes 
take longer to search for a competitive job due to the fact that their parents can afford to support 
them during this time. So by waiting for that high paying job, the youth who can wait it out are 
causing unemployment numbers to rise. It is these numbers of youth that are actually causing 
discrepancies in the unemployment numbers.  These kinds of issues are hindering the positive 
growth of the economy in the region.  
From 1996-2006, labor forces in the MENA region had grown three times as much 
annually as in the rest of the developing world, resulting in one of the largest rates of youth 
unemployment in the world (Malik and Awadallah 2011, 2). In 2010, the percentage of 
unemployed was officially estimated at 10 percent in Egypt and 15 percent in Tunisia, but stood 
at 30 and 25 percent among youths in the 15-29 age bracket (See Table 9) (El-Meehy 2011, 3). 
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The outlook is gloomy at best as it can take up to 24 months for someone to successfully find a 
job in Egypt while in Tunisia it can take up to 28 months. The last statement is truly alarming. 
This is a big uphill battle that the countries in the MENA region are faced with as the population 
continues to grow.  
Another area of concern when dealing with the development of a country is the 
possibility of economic crises that can threaten democracy, such as the 2008 global slowdown. 
These types of events can cause a lag that will increase social unrest. On a historical note it is 
these economic crises and difficulties that have been known to be associated with such 
democratic breakthroughs. When a country goes through such events as sudden collapses of 
stable autocratic regimes the outcome can be damaging to the entire economic infrastructure and 
the possibility of increasing authoritarianism. The current issues taking place in the MENA 
region may or may not have felt the implications of the financial meltdown as a whole, but each 
country still is affected in some ways with the recent turmoil taking place. Add all of these 
economic factors up and it seems that they would have a negative impact on democratization 
throughout the region. 
That is why education and the economy have to be at the forefront of the reforms. 
Without these two key pieces of the social network the societies in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia will 
not prosper. But the outlook is bleak. Even as the governments provide some of the basic 
necessities, the poverty that is going on throughout the region has to be addressed. In some cases 
income levels do not play a significant part in health and education as these things are largely 
publicly provided to the masses. In the majority of the MENA countries education even at the 
post-secondary level is freely provided, which should lead to greater equality of years of 
schooling. But this doesn’t mean everyone is still able to receive free education as it is 
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competitive and therefore distributed on a rationed basis. This typically is the case for the lower 
incomes.  
Poverty is one of the main barriers to education for both girls and boys, but other 
obstacles include adverse cultural practices, poor quality of teaching and school facilities and the 
distance to schools which can affect girls more deeply, perhaps helping to explain why girls 
living in rural areas can face additional challenges in attending secondary school (Barnes, 
Bouchama, and Loiseau 2011, 6). Again closely tied to the treatment of women in the region, the 
economy will lose out on women’s productive capacity if it’s not harnessed by access to 
employment. If women are unable to participate in community and public life then this has 
negative implications for their integration into and contribution to society (Barnes, et al. 2011, 
19). 
These education standards become more and more of a barrier to lower income and some 
middle class families. There are prices that come with schooling. The out-of-pocket expenditures 
for education have created a new level of hardship for these families.  For example, in Egypt, 
private tutoring has become an essential part of preparation in admission into universities 
(Salehi-Isfahani 2010, 32). When it comes to education the less fortunate citizens are unable to 
afford these, in other words luxury items; therefore the quality of education lags behind. In the 
end the lack of opportunity may cause them to lose out to the more competitive drive of the 
universities and employment down the road. Everything in Egypt from obtaining a driver's 
license to getting an education is formally very cheap but in practice very expensive, since most 
transactions, official and unofficial, are accompanied by off-the books payments. The 
government pays schoolteachers a pittance, so public education is poor and the teacher’s 
supplement their salaries by providing private lessons that are essential preparation for school 
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exams. So widespread corruption continues to plague Egypt and will be tough to completely 
eradicate.  
This is the de jure factor at work. A country can change regimes, but unless the old 
players are removed the political power will just be redistributed leaving the basic economic 
structures unaltered. As these young Egyptians are seeing it can be quite difficult to unseat these 
old bureaucrats from years and decades of power and wealth. It will be a work in progress much 
like that of anything when change comes. But it is also these wealthy patrons that can offer 
guidance to the younger generations in regards to creating better regional economic commons for 
all people. By doing so this will boost regional markets, in return redistributing to the poorer 
class, which would be a critical hand-out to the masses instead of handing out billions of dollars 
in subsidies that only on paper keep the economy alive. One way to do this would be to create an 
‘open access order’, by bringing people of lower income and poverty levels to the mainstream. In 
essence this offers them a stepping stone process for economic mobility; this process grants 
equal access defined by merit and competitiveness, rather than wasita or political connections. 
This single effect can open the door for the masses, but it also is one that will be tough to break 
through, because of the decades of political corruption.  
One hindrance will be the challenge to create jobs in the region. Over the next decade or 
so the MENA countries must create 100 million jobs to keep up with the numbers of the growing 
population (Malik and Awadallah 2011, 27). Part of this challenge will be to open up the private 
work sector; without this arena any gains in the human capital will go for nothing. For this to 
work the governments have to be willing to set aside their past economic governance and allow 
the regional markets to thrive and the private sectors be included in the growth of the economies. 
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This will be easier said than done in a region that has become more centralized around its 
governments and therefore in the end becoming more fragmented.  
It is tough to estimate the number of individuals who live in poverty, because the 
numbers seem to be unreliable. This seems to be the trend as the standards for poverty level are 
generally set lower to that of per capita gross national income levels of these same countries. In 
recent years both Egypt and Tunisia saw a rise in their incidences of poverty due to impending 
financial, food and fuel crises. Despite desperate attempts by both regimes to keep these events 


















The main principle of this thesis is to contribute to the explanation and description of 
regime change in the Middle East and North Africa through the aspects of transitional 
democracy. Those factors that are most important are: technology and social media, regime type, 
gender equality, economics and education. This thesis is intended to show the process that a 
country faces when transitioning from an authoritarian regime to a democratic form of 
government. There can be negative dynamics that work against these countries, yet there are also 
promising outcomes coming out of the Arab Spring revolts. As these countries move forward 
there is still much work to be done in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia in regards towards democracy. 
Each country faces a number of concerns that equally decide the outcome. These countries face 
uphill battles as their transitional phase towards democracy continues to be a slippery one. Each 
step forward is in the positive direction, but if the current state of political unrest continues to 
become more violent and negative in thought this presents the opportunity for the country to 
slide back into authoritarianism.  
Given the fighting chance democracy will take root in the Middle East and Northern 
Africa regions, but only if the citizens of those respected countries chose to stand up for their 
own freedom. Throughout history there, revolutions have undergone phases of setback, real or 
apparent; these revolutions of 2011 will be no different. Even after a peaceful revolution, it 
generally takes half a decade for any type of stable regime to consolidate (Goldstone 2011, 7).  
That time table is even longer if at all achievable due to the likes of a civil war breaking out or if 
a counterrevolution arises. That is what these countries are faced with as they move forward.  
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Each country saw the respected revolutions that took place use similar formulas. These 
formulas are what many people throughout the world already have at their fingertips in everyday 
life: technology, civil liberties, freedom of speech, right to education, equal opportunities, and a 
better way of living. Yet, the people of Egypt, Libya and Tunisia in most ways never were given 
the opportunities to take part in such liberties that many of us in the free world take for granted. 
If the awareness of these issues and that of gender inequality issues are not sufficient for a 
country to act on, then the development or reform of policies has to be at the very least the area 
of concern of necessary improvements.  
During the Arab Spring there were a handful of reasons as to why the movement was as 
successful as it was. Social media is only one of the crucial elements that helped pave the way 
for the Arab Spring. When the revolts of the Arab Spring took place the use of social media 
cannot be single handedly be cited as to what led to the unraveling of three separate regimes in 
the MENA region. It, however, helped individuals who may not have been linked together in 
society achieve a common goal (Beck and Huser 2012, 7). The future of technology becoming 
more and more advanced, along with being intertwined with everyday life from America to the 
Middle East and beyond will definitely reveal new vulnerabilities and opportunities in the 
developing world. Without the use of technology the Arab Spring quite possibly could not have 
happened, but with the wills of so many different individuals it was a reality.  
An inequality of justice towards both genders is something that no one should have to 
every deal with, as every human deserves to have the opportunity to be equal. Democratic 
development couldn’t happen without the involvement of women. These situations are even 
greater for women living in the developing world, especially when dealing with the family, 
identity, and health dimensions. Depending on the country or the region concerned, the fight 
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against all forms of gender discrimination is appropriate. Therefore it is these same women that 
deserve equality and who played an important part in the successful plan of action during the 
revolutions.  
The youth and the men were not the only ones that played an important aspect of these 
revolutions; women also employed a stable source of guidance or leadership throughout the 
entire process. One of the many reasons the Arab Spring was so successful was that of the 
women’s role in the overall structural process. It is important for the future success of Egypt, 
Libya, Tunisia and other countries that experience these sorts of revolutions that women continue 
to be seen as a valuable asset and have a place in society and government. The longstanding 
exclusion of women from the political processes and decision making in the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) may be key to understanding why the region has been a ‘laggard’, when 
compared with the other regions, in democratization’s third wave.  
Economics and education go hand-in-hand no matter the case throughout the world. The 
lack of education will ultimately lead to a downfall in a country’s economical standard. When a 
country is faced with poorer standards of living, lower education rates and gender inequalities it 
is almost certain to face less than desirable economic conditions across the board. The high 
unemployment rate most definitely contributed to the changing of the regimes. These individuals 
who couldn’t find work or any sort of constant standard of living were a product of the system. 
The effects of globalization can either help or hinder a country’s rise to democracy. With their 
export economies the Middle Eastern countries lacked diversification and did not have a 
competitive advantage in markets that are dominated by the hegemonic powers. These weak 
economies that the Middle East countries typically have are a product of their authoritarian 
regimes and the way they control all vested interests of the local markets.  
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This was the issue in Egypt under sultanistic dictators, such as Mubarak where he 
arranged national agendas around a personal consolidation of power, ensuring that the mass 
population remained depoliticized, disorganized and ineffectual (Moore 2012, 4). Therefore with 
dictators in power like him the country was bound to fail and not reach any economic growth 
potential. These long-standing social-economic conditions helped pave the way for the revolts. 
The one drawback to globalization throughout much of the world and specifically the Middle 
East is that it has been typically viewed through the Western constructed institutionalized 
concept of democracy. And it is that democracy that differs from Middle Eastern democratic 
ideas, which do not necessarily incorporate the same structures or systems (Moore 2012, 4). The 
only true successful globalization in the MENA region must come from within. Any external 
help must only be provided for if asked for in good faith, and in the best interest of that country, 
not whatever international actor is providing the help. 
So were the Arab Spring uprisings part of an overall shift of the masses unhappy with 
living conditions in their respected countries or were they part of a bigger picture linked to 
globalization?  By dissecting the events piece by piece in each of the three countries a link can be 
made back to globalization. But at the same time it can be attributed to the social issues. Without 
positive economic growth a country becomes stagnant. As the number of unemployed continues 
to rise, those frustrated individuals start to grow unruly towards the regimes. It is these events 
that can spark revolts. So in essence globalization did play a part in the revolts in the MENA 
region. The protests were a direct result of globalization, not to mention an unprotected exposure 
to the imbalance of the free market mechanisms. This region lacks many of the essential 
freedoms and opportunities that other parts of the world thrive in. Until the region becomes 
stable with strong pro-economic growth governments at the helm prospects will continue to look 
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gloomy. That is why education reforms must be addressed. It is paramount that education must 
start at the earliest of ages for the transition phase to be fully successful.  
There is good news when it comes to education. It seems that even with the numbers of 
unemployed being high, the educational level for most continues to grow. Many of these 
unemployed are well educated; there are just not enough jobs to go around for the masses. Even 
the gender gap between men and women in the region has closed in educational attainment. 
Every child in the MENA region should be given equal education opportunities no matter the 
family’s status in the community or level of income. As these kids continue to grow and 
experience the same hardships that their parents and generations before them experienced; the 
situations in the region will not change. Education should fall under the basics of necessities for 
every human being.   
The crisis in the Middle East cannot just be attributed to the Arab state, but in many ways 
its failed efforts to redistribute, reform and represent the ordinary citizen’s interests. These 
interests are that of any ordinary citizen throughout the world: a better standard of living, 
education, health care, and equality. One area that was not discussed in this thesis critical to the 
changing conditions of a country’s economic progress was that of food shortage. The MENA 
region as a whole is one of the most food deficit regions in the world. Due to falling productions 
in agriculture the region is heavily dependent on food imports (Malik and Awadallah 2011, 6). 
This also attributes to struggling economic standards and poverty levels respectfully throughout 
the region as countries have to spend more of their budgets to provide food to the public. Food 
shortage is another example of the issues that Egypt, Libya and Tunisia are faced with as the 
existing governments are in the transitioning phase. In Egypt alone food subsides (directed 
mostly to wheat) consumed $3 billion US dollars in 2010 (Malik and Awadallah 2011, 6). 
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Further research would be ideal on this area to see just how great of an impact it has on the 
economic growth of the countries. As these countries continue to transition they are faced with 
many underlying challenges of change.       
The comparison between the revolts in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia can be argued in many 
ways. One claim is that Libya was the only country to fully achieve the revolutionary goal. Jack 
Goldstone, director of Center for Global Policy, believes that for a revolution to succeed a 
number of following principles must be achieved: the government must considered a threat to the 
country’s future, elites (including the military) must be unwilling to defend the state, a widely-
representative section of society must mobilize, and international powers must either refuse to 
protect the government, or intervene (Goldstone 2011, 1). Therefore with the exception of Libya, 
and due to an absence of international intervention, the uprisings on the whole fail to constitute a 
revolution (Moore 2012, 1). 
This claim is false. There are plenty of reasons to believe that the three separate 
revolutions that took place during the Arab Spring were in fact successfully achieved. As he 
states it, a government must believe there is a true threat for the future; in each case as much as 
the leaders wouldn’t go on record and say that they felt their countries were unsecure, they knew 
this was the true case. The other key points he talks about all took place in some form. It was the 
masses that took to the streets that gave a growing presence that change was happening. The 
world saw the regimes of Mubarak, al-Qaddafi and Ben Ali crumble at the hands of the people, 
along with the help of the elites that included the military. Therefore how can one argue and saw 
that these revolutions were in sense failures? It is exactly these types of revolutions that other 
countries will look at and quite possibly model a reform of their own to oust whatever 
authoritarian oppressive regime standing in their way. The Arab Spring was a success.  
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It will take the efforts of the middle class, men and women, small business owners and 
the likes of the political elite to continue this transition of future success. It must be up to the 
citizens to choose their respected presidents, parliamentarians, village mayors, their trade union, 
and whomever else they feel is right to govern them as elected leaders. Women must be included 
in every step of the transition phase. Without the voice of the feminist side to have equal 
representation then democracy will not work. Not only is it gender equality that will continue the 
need to be addressed, but it is also the youth population. With the world’s population growing 
governments need to be more in touch with the younger generations and listen to their opinions. 
They hold the key to the future. When it comes down to economics of a country, all walks of life 
must have a binding say in those decisions that affect their lives. Economics only cannot be the 
focus, but other avenues that affect everyday life like common liberties such as free press, the 
practice of religion, medical attention and education should all be included in the choices of the 
citizens, not be forced upon them.  
The coming years will reveal how much of these changes may have happened or will take 
place and how. Each country comes from a storied past and just as promising future. Egypt, 
Libya and Tunisia all face different paths towards democracy. It is these paths that are chosen 
that will determine the future of existence as a free and democratic society. Generally post-
revolutionary there are divisions within the opposition that start to surface. It’s not uncommon 
for the acting government official or military commander to hold new elections as a necessary 
first step in the rebuilding phase. The overall political process then follows with further elections 
and then decisions to possibly write and introduce new legislation or a new constitution. These 
are the critical decisions that acting powers will be faced with during the post-revolution process 
in order to meet the needs of the citizens. It is highly likely that as conservatives, populists, 
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Islamists, and modernizing reformers fight for power in Tunisia, Egypt, and possibly even Libya 
that those countries will be faced with lengthy periods of unexpected government turnovers and 
policy reversals. It is not that of an uncommon scenario that could play out.  
United States President Obama lit a fire under the Arab world by his profound statement 
during a trip to Cairo in 2009. Even before the Arab Spring took place the words that he spoke 
carried great weight.  
An unyielding belief that all people yearn for certain things: the ability to 
speak your mind and have a say in how you are governed; confidence in the rule 
of law and the equal administration of justice; government that is transparent and 
doesn't steal from the people; the freedom to live as you choose. These are not 
just American ideas; they are human rights. And that is why we will support them 
everywhere -- President Barack Obama (Anderson 2011, 7).  
 
These events mark a significant shift in world history. As the world witnessed during the 
end of 2010 and throughout 2011, dramatic changes occurred in the way that democratic 
transition took place that most likely will lead to further revolutions. The year what would be 
known as the Arab Spring throughout the world has reminded us all that ordinary people want 
freedom even in societies where such aspirations have been written off as futile. But these efforts 
are not futile. It is these aspirations of just a handful of citizens in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia that 
led the revolts of the masses to see to it that those very freedoms can be grasped. Living under 
the rule of oppressive rulers will not be tolerated. The people have spoken.  
The world’s leading democracies, especially the United States, hopefully learned lessons 
during the Arab Spring that the help should only come from the outside community when it is 
requested. Just as NATO was the international force behind the Libyan movement, what most 
revolutions of the future need is strong support from the outside players in the avenue of ‘words 
of wisdom’ to help the process of democracy move along. Inserting democracy via a prolonged 
military campaign or by forcing it onto a country is not the way that democracy will successfully 
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spread.  It solely should be left up to the citizens of the country to decide on whether they want 
to be free. When those opportunities have been opened up by the likes of the Egyptian, Libyan 
and Tunisian people, hopefully it will address the challenges that lie ahead during the transitional 
democratization period of how dictatorships can be overturned, and how stable, long-lasting and 
effective democracies can be built in their place. 
After the successful toppling of al-Qaddafi’s regime the future of Libya is in need of a 
full political revamp that has to include the establishing the rule of law, creating a modern 
constitution, building a democratic state, and establishing political pluralism. These are the 
necessary pieces of the transitional puzzle that must be achieved. For citizens that have been 
oppressed and out of touch with the right to express their political opinion for the last 40 years, it 
will take some time. It will take time for Libya, as stated by the writer Abdul Munsif al-Buri, “It 
is not an exaggeration to say that the situation in Libya will be fraught with dangers, difficulties 
and problems however good the intentions are, and however good and bright our hopes, wishes 
and dreams” (Hatita 2011, 5). But like that of anything the help through wealth, a sparse 
population, and foreign attention should see Libya through this transitioning period.  
Of course Libya has many political and security challenges that lie ahead and has yet to 
hold its first post-al-Qaddafi elections. Life in Libya post-al-Qaddafi has been turbulent to say 
the least. One of the issues with Libya’s transition process is that there is not a single promising 
figure to successfully lead the future of the country. The recent U.S. Embassy bombings in 
Benghazi that killed the U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens, along with several others have 
been part of a recent wave of violence of hatred once again towards the West. These types of 
events will only hamper the transition process. 
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Now that the Ben Ali regime has been defeated, Tunisia has already shown signs of a 
young democracy, but there is still a lengthy transitional phase that will continue. The beginning 
of this transition period has already taken a step in the right direction towards from an Arab 
autocracy to an electoral democracy. The new leaders have pledged themselves to moderation, 
adherence to civil liberties, and the rule of law (Anderson 2011, 3). These events show that 
Tunisia is ready for the future, but it will take time to build a stable democratic government. 
Areas that were once so corrupt have found new life. The media now can report unbiased news 
that is important to the building process. The reform of complex issues that are taking place is 
just one area that the new leadership must continue to tackle. These types of issues that have not 
been addressed for many years will need time to be worked out and it will take both civil 
society’s input along with that of the newly elected officials. One area of consideration for a 
continued successful transition is that Tunisians will need to grapple with the class system. The 
different class structures that came together for a common goal must continue to work together 
for the future of Tunisia.  
All these developments should give one cause for optimism today. In the case of the new 
Egyptian government the potential to build and sustain an open society is one that can be 
accomplished. It will be the young Egyptians, who started the Arab Spring uprising through 
peaceful protests that must continue to demand political (democratic) and economic 
(employment) reforms. When the protests started they cried out for ‘dignity, freedom and 
equality’; it is now time for them to stand up and protect these qualities that they seek. It is their 
time to put down their name in history and show that democracy can exist in a Muslim society.  
Before 2011, the Middle East and North Africa region stood out on the map with a red-
pin as one of the last standing parts of the world without a single democratic country. With the 
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Jasmine Revolution taking place in Tunisia and Nile Revolution in Egypt there is hope that will 
change.  The authoritarian way of life for the time being has come to an end. Only hope and 
prosper lie as true challenges ahead. Each country must make the best out of its revolutions in 
order to see the full success of democracy and the freedoms that it brings. There is much to be 
seen as to how the entire picture plays out in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, and for that fact much of 
the rest of the Middle East region. These countries alone witnessed what can take place when the 
masses have had enough of the aging authoritarian regimes and stand up for what they believe in. 
That is why the men and women of the MENA region deserve democracy. It should be the right 
that all men on this earth are created equal and deserve to be free. Therefore the only way for 
men and women to be truly free is that of a democratic society that is ‘ruled by the people’.   
As the coming years approach the region there will be highs and lows that are associated 
with the transitioning period due to the revolutions. Some of these will no doubt put into 
question the chances of democracy to survive. The region has not had the same opportunities to 
cherish democracy like others in the world; it will not be easy and will come with difficulties. 
These difficulties will be no different than what other countries experienced as they transitioned 
to democracy. If the people truly want those so-called freedoms in life they will work together to 
make democracy work. The system is far from perfect, but given a chance the positives will 
outweigh the negatives. It will take a lot of dedicated hard work of likeminded individuals to be 
able to guide these respected governments through the transition process.  
One of the biggest challenges that lies ahead is trying to get past the fact that democracy 
can happen without the attributes of the Western world. It is a common misnomer that 
democracy and the West are one in the same, but democracy can be achieved nonetheless. As 
leaders throughout the world promote a stronger democratic practice and a world-wide goal of 
61 
 
peace, they have to find a common ground to make it work. The revolutions of late 2010 and 
early 2011 are not the first ones that Egypt, Libya and Tunisia have experienced, and as history 
has seen before there will be future revolutions. The road is a long and windy one as it is not 
about the destination of these countries, but ultimately the process of how they go about 
separating themselves from authoritarianism and establishing democracy. It will not be an easy 
transition. Just as countries before have experienced throughout history, democracy doesn’t 
come without sacrifices.  
As the world slowly moves further into the 21
st
 century it is not the will of ill men to 
control the rights of everyone, but the right for every man to control his own destiny. That is why 

















Table 1 Freedom Status, 1972- 2011 
          
Year Under 
Review 
Total Number of 
Countries 
Partly Free 
Number               % 
Not Free 
Number               % 
Free  
Number               % 
2011 195 87                       45 60                       31 48                       24 
2010 194 87                       45 60                       31 47                       24 
2009 194 89                       46 58                       30 47                       24 
2008 193 89                       46 62                       32 42                       22 
2007 193 90                       47 60                       31 43                       22 
2006 193 90                       47 58                       30 45                       23 
2005 192 89                       46 58                       30 45                       24 
2004 192 89                       46 54                       28 49                       26 
2003 192 88                       46 55                       29 49                       25 
2002 192 89                       46 55                       29 48                       25 
2001 192 85                       44 59                       31 48                       25 
2000 192 86                       45 58                       30 48                       25 
 
  
Notes: FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2012: THE ARAB UPRISINGS AND THEIR GLOBAL REPERCUSSIONS 
 
Table 2 Largest Net Changes in Total Aggregate Score, 2007-2011 
   
IMPROVEMENTS 
Tunisia                  35 
Egypt                    10 
Libya                      9 
 
Notes: This table shows the countries with the largest net gains in total aggregate score (0–100) between Freedom in 
the World 2008 and Freedom in the World 2012. 
 
Table 3 Democracy Index, 2010, by Regime Type 
   No. of countries   % of countries   % of world population 
Full democracies   26            15.6    12.3 
Flawed democracies   53            31.7    37.2 
Hybrid regimes   33            19.8    14.0 
Authoritarian regimes  55            32.9    36.5 
Note. “World” population refers to the total population of the 167 countries covered by the index. Since this 
excludes only micro states, this is nearly equal to the entire actual estimated world population in 2010. 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. 
63 
 
Table 4 Women in National Parliaments  
Rank 
 
Country  Lower or Single House 
Elections   Seats*    Women     % W 
Upper House or Senate 
Elections   Seats*    Women     % W 
39 Tunisia 10 
2011 
217 58 26.7% --- --- --- ---  




508 10 2.0% 1 2012 180 5 2.8%  
Source: International Parliamentary Union, 2011 http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm 
 
* Figures correspond to the number of seats currently filled in Parliament  
Libya: Following the popular uprising and protracted fighting that eventually ousted Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi, the 
General People's Congress - the unicameral parliament of the now defunct Libyan Arab Jamahiriya - has ceased to 
function. Parliamentary elections are expected to be held in 2012 under the supervision of the National Transitional 
Council, the interim government of the new Libya.  
 
Table 5  The GII Ranking 
Country    GII    rank 
Egypt, Arab Rep.        0.465                  73 
Libya                           0.497                  77 
Tunisia                        0.156                  42 
 
*Within the sample used here 109 developing countries provide information on all the 32 variables. The choice is 
guided by the availability of information so that as many countries as possible can be ranked. As the indicators 
primarily measure gender inequalities that pose problems in the developing world, the OECD countries are excluded 
in the first part of the factor analysis. 
 
Table 6  Inequality for Selected MENA Countries and Regions 
 
Country   Gini Coefficient 
Egypt    32.45 
Libya    Not Available  
Tunisia   40.81 
MENA   38.20 
Low income   37.57 
Middle income  43.56 
High income   36.23_________ 
 
Notes: Averages of reported Gini coefficients for 2000-07, population weighted. 







Table 7 Summary of Statistics by Region (1980–2007) 
 
Economic growth    Financial development   Real sector 
 
GDP per capita (US $) Growth (%)  DCPS (%) DCBS (%) M3 (%) GDS (%)  TRADE (%) GOV (%) INF (%) 
Middle East & North Africa (N= 12) 
Mean    2,0266       0.9   35.2     58.8        68.5     11.1           72.3        19.1       14.9 
Median 1,406.3       1.3   33.7        55.8        60.2     15.3  65.4           16.3         7.8 
Max   6,714.0       2.6              70.6      131.9      172.4     34.9         123.8           30.0       77.1 
Min      498.8     −2.0                  5.5          6.7        20.7   −23.8           38.4           13.1         4.3 
Note: This table summarizes country-year statistics for six geographic regions and high-income OECD and non-
OECD countries classified according to the World Bank. The time series average of each variable is calculated and 
then statistics are collected cross-country. Economies are divided according to 2008 GNI per capita, calculated using 
the World Bank Atlas method. The groups are: low income, $975 per capita or less; lower middle income, $976–
$3855 per capita; upper middle income, $3856–$11,905 per capita; and high income, $11,906 per capita or more. 
Geographic classifications are assigned only for low-income and middle-income economies. DCPS: domestic credit 
provided to private sector; DCBS: domestic credit provided by banking sector; M3: liquid liabilities; GDS: gross 
domestic savings; TRADE: import plus export; GOV: government expenditure, all as a proportion of GDP; INF: 
inflation rate. 
 
Table 8  Unemployment Rates by Education, Average 2000-2007   
 
No. of   Primary Secondary Tertiary 
   countries 
 
MENA   15   11.28   15.68   13.67 
Low income   27   5.14   7.30   8.94 
Middle income  50   10.33   12.90   9.53 
High income   42   10.28   6.93   4.48 
 
 
Note: Population weighted averages. Country classification is based on GDP per capita in 2005 
PPP US dollars: Low income less than $3000; middle income $3000-$15000; high income greater than $15000. 














Table 9  Youth Unemployment in Selected Countries, Ages 15-29 
 
                    Youth            Overall       Youth/Overall 
 
 
Notes: Country classification is based on GDP per capita in 2005 PPP US dollars: Low income: less than $3000; 
middle income: $3000-$15000; high income: greater than $15000. Source: Country groups are from WDI (ages 15-















Egypt 24.8 10.16 2.44 
Libya … ... … 
Tunisia 27.3 14.84 1.84 
MENA Reg. 25.9 11.14 2.32 
Low Income 9.9 4.88 2.03 
Mid. Income 19.6 6.58 2.98 





Figure 1 Middle East and North Africa  
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